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Reflections on Reflectivity: Comments on Evan Thompson’s Waking,
Dreaming, Being
Jay L. Garfield
Smith and Harvard Divinity School
University of Melbourne; Central University of Tibetan Studies

Evan Thompson has written a marvelous book. Waking, Dreaming, Being blends
intellectual autobiography, phenomenology, cognitive science, studies in Buddhist
and Vedānta philosophy, and creative metaphilosophy in an exploration of what it
is to be a person, of the nature of consciousness, and of the relation of contemplative to scientific method in the understanding of human life. I have learned a great
deal from it, and the community of philosophers and cognitive scientists will be
reading and discussing it for some time. But I have come to criticize Thompson, not
to praise him. Here I raise a few issues regarding Thompson’s treatment of the self
and the connections between his own account and the Madhyamaka and Yogācāra accounts with which he juxtaposes it, and then turn to his treatment of consciousness and end up with some questions about his commitment to the reflexivity
of awareness. But I emphasize that these sets of worries are specific and local, and
should be seen in the context of genuine admiration for this fine volume and for
its author.
The Self
I would like to begin by focusing on Thompson’s appeal to Candrakīrti in his defense of a view that there is in fact a self. Now, I have appealed to Candrakīrti’s
arguments in favor of the view that there is no self (Garfield 2015, pp. 111–115).
There are two questions here. First, what does Candrakīrti say? Second, is Can
drakīrti right? These will help us answer another question: Is Thompson right? Thompson says:
But here’s the crucial point — Candrakīrti doesn’t conclude that there is no self. That
would be to succumb to the nihilistic extreme, which says that since the self has no independent existence, it has no existence at all. Instead, Candrakīrti concludes that the self
is dependently arisen. In other words, the self exists dependent on causes and conditions,
including especially how we mentally construct it and name it in language.
Recall that in Prāsaṅgika Madhyamaka the idea that whatever is dependently arisen depends for its existence on a basis of designation, a designating cognition and a term used
to designate it. In the case of the self, the five aggregates are the basis of designation, the
thought that projects “self” onto the aggregates is the designating cognition, and the pronoun “I” is the term used to designate it. (2015, p. 364)

He concludes this discussion by saying:

Philosophy East & West Volume 66, Number 3 July 2016 943–951
© 2016 by University of Hawai‘i Press

943

Candrakīrti . . . says that the fundamental illusion is that we take the self to exist by virtue
of its own being, when in reality its existence is dependent. The illusion is cognitive and
existential. (p. 365)

So, let us be clear about what Thompson is saying. He argues that Candrakīrti
correctly says that while there is no independent self, there is a real, dependent self,
and that the middle path that Candrakīrti seeks is a midpoint between reifying the
self as an independent, substantial existent and a nihilistic position according to
which there is no self at all. It is important first of all to get the philology right. So let
us look at the locus classicus for Candrakīrti’s view, a passage late in chapter 6 of the
Madhyamakāvatāra-bhāṣya. Here is what Candrakīrti says in my translation of the
Tibetan edition:
158 Although, neither from the standpoint of reality, nor conventionally
Is it demonstrated to exist in any of the seven possible ways,
Conventionally, and without analysis,
It is designated in dependence upon its parts.
. . . In this way, without any analysis, on the basis of such things as blueness, sensation,
[and] the other aggregates are things designated. Therefore, they are only maintained to
have arisen on the basis of conditions in accord with dependent origination and so are
mere dependent designations. Our position does not contradict ordinary experience. . . .
(1992, pp. 258–259)
162 Thus, on the basis of mundane conventions,
It is even said that the self is the appropriator of
The aggregates, their domains, and the sense faculties
And as the appropriator is an agent. (pp. 262–263)

Up to this point, Thompson is smiling. While things might be a bit ambiguous, it
certainly looks like things could go his way. After all, Candrakīrti does say that “it is
said that the self is the appropriator . . . and . . . is the agent,” and that sounds like an
affirmation of a self. But look at the next verse:
163

But since there is no such entity, it is not permanent.
Nor is it impermanent, arisen, or destroyed.
It has no characteristic such as identity.
Nor is it different from anything. (p. 263)

This self that is designated on the basis of the aggregates — although it is dependent in this
way — since it does not exist is not really dependent, and does not exist at all. . . .
165

Since without an agent there is no action
Without a self, there is no “mine.”
So, by seeing that both I and mine are empty,
Practitioners become completely liberated. (p. 264)

Candrakīrti does not argue that this self that is “said to be the appropriator and the
agent” is real at all. He argues instead that it is completely non-existent. By Thomp-
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son’s lights, then, even the glorious Candrakīrti has fallen into the abyss of nihilism.
Of course this doesn’t settle much of importance. Thompson might be wrong about
Candrakīrti, but right about the self. And Candrakīrti might not be right about things.
He might be a nihilistic fool. Or, we might be enmeshed in a verbal quibble about
the English word self, the Sanskrit word ātman, and the Tibetan word bdag. Let’s
come back to these questions by taking a detour through some other remarks on the
subject of the self.
In the first sentence of the introduction to his book, Thompson says:
The central idea of this book is that the self is a process, not a thing or an entity. The self
isn’t something outside experience, hidden either in the brain or in some immaterial
realm. It is an experiential process that is subject to constant change. We enact a self in
the process of awareness, and this self comes and goes depending on how we are aware.
(p. xxxi)

And indeed this is the view of the self for which Thompson argues throughout the
text. And indeed this is a middle path of sorts between a particular pair of two extremes. The self is not a thing: that would be the extreme of reification. But neither is
it nothing: that would be the extreme of nihilism (to which we have seen, by Thompson’s lights, Candrakīrti himself might be committed). Instead it is a real process, a
process that is both enacted and experienced. And of course, processes are one kind
of real thing. Thompson tells us more about the nature of the enaction that creates
the self:
344
. . . [T]he crucial ingredient that takes us from a self-specifying system to a full-fledged
I-making system is that of being a “self-designating” system. A self-designating system is
one that can designate itself as a self. This means that it can attend to its changing experiential states and conceive of itself as the subject of those states. (p. 344)
Memory and prospection are the crucial mental capacities enabling you to think of yourself as an “I” who endures through time as a thinker of thoughts and a doer of deeds.
Memory and prospection create a personal and historical sense of self because they enable you to think of yourself as having a unique story line through time. In this kind
of self-projection — also known as mental time travel — every memory of expectation you
encounter normally presents itself as yours, as belonging to you, where you feel as if
you’re one and same self who endures through time as the subject of those experiences.
(p. 348)

I want to put this back in the terms of Buddhist philosophy, to facilitate seeing just
what its relation is to the position of Candrakīrti, and just why I am so suspicious of
it. The model of self-creation here is entirely first-person, a psychological account of
what we call in Sanskrit āhamkāra, or self-construction. The self-designating system,
in this view, is already a self, in the sense that it creates its sense of itself by itself. It
creates the sense that it is an appropriator, even as it appropriates its history, future,
experiences, and body. It is an autobiographical self, and it supervenes on the history
of a single organism. That is the self as Candrakīrti claims that it is understood by
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ordinary folk in verse 162. In Buddhist doxography, that is the self of the school
called the Pudgālavādins, or proponents of a real person, who argued that the self is
a real thing neither identical to nor different from the aggregates, but supervenient
upon them. This is a self that, like Thompson’s processes, is not independent, but is
a real thing, not identical with the aggregates, but existent in dependence on them,
narrowly supervenient upon them (Garfield 2015, pp. 109–111).
In verses 163 and 165 and the commentary on them Candrakīrti explicitly rejects
this position. He argues that there is no such thing at all, not that it is a real process.
The illusion to which Candrakīrti alludes is the illusion to which Thompson, I fear,
succumbs, his allusion to Candrakīrti notwithstanding. And that is the illusion that
when we seek the self with which we identify, the referent of “I,” we find something.
That is a more profound critique of the self than one according to which we find the
wrong thing. Now to be sure, Thompson agrees with everyone in the Buddhist tradition that we don’t find a substantial entity, a soul, or an ātman, that persists unchanging through our life or lives, and whose nature is independent of our actions, thoughts,
and imputations. But he does agree with the Pudgālavādins that we find something,
namely a constructed process. Here is what he says about this:
Although the enactive account of the self that I’m proposing is close in one way to the
Yogācāra account, it also differs from it in another important way. Although I agree with
Yogācara that our sense of self or “I-Me-Mine” is mentally constructed, I don’t think it
follows that there is no self, or that the appearance of the self is nothing but an illusion.
Although some illusions are constructions, not all constructions are illusions. The self is
a case in point. To say that the sense of self is a mental construction — or rather that it’s
a process under constant mental and bodily construction — doesn’t logically imply that
there is no self or that the sense of self presents an illusion. (p. 359)
361
[T]he minimal notion of self that’s crucial for “I-Me-Mine” thinking is that of a subject
of experience and an agent of action, not that of a substantially existent ego. Thinking of
myself in this way — as a subject and agent — enables me to think of some experiences
and actions as mine and not yours, and of some experiences and actions as yours and not
mine. This provides a perfectly legitimate and valuable notion of self and doesn’t require
thinking of you or me as substantially existent entities. (p. 361)

So, Thompson and Candrakīrti do disagree, and the disagreement is not merely
verbal. But who is right? I fear that Candrakīrti is. There is an illusion pervasive in
human self-conception; Thompson, his Pudgālavādin forebears, and Candrakīrti are
all right to focus on that problem. But Candrakīrti sees more deeply into the matter.
The illusion is that this construction is an individual matter, that we can isolate the
referent of “I” at all, and that there is a unified subject of experience and agent
of action.
Candrakīrti grants with Thompson that our sense of self is constructed, but he,
with the Yogācārins he criticizes so trenchantly on other matters, believes that what
is constructed itself is an illusion, in that it presents us to ourselves in a way that we
can never exist. Briefly, here are the issues that divide Candrakīrti (and me) from
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Thompson and the Pudgālavādins: First, Candrakīrti argues that we are constituted
not in isolation, but in ensemble. Candrakīrti’s use of terms like samvṛti, vyavahāra,
lokaprasiddhi, et cetera are meant to convey the public, transactional creation of
personae, masks — temporary, shifting identities determined not only by those who
wear the masks, but those who assign them identities and meaning. I am a teacher, a
son, a father, an American, an Australian, a Singaporean, a friend of Thompson’s, a
critic of Thompson’s, et cetera. These are public roles, not roles I create on my own,
but which are created in my interaction with others, and they, not my own psychological processes, constitute my shifting identities.
Second, the apparent unity to my experience is a construction. If to be a self is to
be a subject, a unified center of consciousness, we are not selves. Persons, yes, but
not selves. Our subjectivity is too complex, too fragmented, too multilayered for that.
The transcendental unity of apperception that Kant thought was necessary to our
identity (an idea carried over through Husserl into Thompson’s thinking) is, from the
standpoint of Buddhist philosophy and from a lot of cognitive science, alas, not even
actual. Agency is equally fragmented. Our sense that there is a unity of decision making when we act is simply false. The springs of action are manifold, and we often
rationalize our motives ex post facto.
These are precisely the phenomena to which Candrakīrti as well as Asanga and
Vasubandhu advert when they say that the self as a narrative center of gravity (to use
Daniel Dennett’s apt term) or as a center of agency or as something supervenient
upon our aggregates — the thing to which we take ourselves to advert when we say
“I” — simply is non-existent. What Thompson takes to be a real construction is, from
the standpoint of those with whom he wishes to ally himself, simply an illusion.1 And
I go with them. What is real, instead, is the person, a loose set of conventions with
no center, no unity, no persistence. I hope that Thompson follows Candrakīrti down
the path of the meditation on selflessness. It is scary, but it takes one in the right
direction.
Consciousness
On to consciousness. The song remains the same. Just as Thompson reifies the self in
his sincere effort to desubstantialize it, he treats consciousness as a thing, even as he
recognizes its multiple kinds and instances. So, for instance, early in the book Thompson wonders about consciousness in deep sleep:
If deep sleep is peaceful and blissful, does this mean that we’re somehow conscious in
deep sleep? Is awareness present, or is deep sleep the oblivion of awareness? Put another
way, is deep sleep a state of consciousness, like waking and dreaming, or is it a state
where consciousness is absent . . . ? (p. 5)

“Is consciousness present or absent?” we are invited to wonder. But let us first
wonder about the referent of the term. Of what are we asking, “Is it present or absent?” Now Thompson has distinguished several senses of consciousness — creature,
access, phenomenal — and so he recognizes that the phenomenon he is addressing is
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not simple. That is to be commended. But in cases like this, and in the following
passage where he wonders whether consciousness is punctual or fluid, we still find
it treated as a thing — whether a process or a property, or whatever — that is never
clear, it is something that can be there or not:
According to the Abhidharma philosophers, what appears as a uniform stream of consciousness to the untrained observer is really an articulated sequence of discrete moments
of awareness. . . . Maybe premeditative consciousness is discrete and not uniform. Maybe
premeditative consciousness is uniform and Vipassanā meditation makes it discrete.
(pp. 56–57)

What is wrong with this? It is, I fear, a mystification. I am right now far from
Thompson. And he is far from me. Does that mean that our far-from-each-otherness
is present? And where does it go when we meet at a conference? Is it continuous or
punctual? Is my farness from Thompson the same as or different from his farness from
me? Just as we can use the first-person pronoun without positing a self to which it
must refer, we can talk about being conscious, and indeed about many ways of being
conscious, without positing consciousness, by virtue of which we are conscious.
One of the more puzzling problems in the contemporary industry of consciousness
studies is the move from the adjective or the relation to the putative property or phenomenon that is presumed to make it possible to be conscious. One sign of this
mystification is the hardness of the so-called “hard problem,” which, I suspect, derives not from the difficulty of explaining the obviously real phenomenon of con
sciousness in physical terms, but from the difficulty of identifying anything to explain.
We see some of this in Thompson’s own comments:
Here’s the crucial deeper message: Consciousness itself has not and cannot be observed
through the scientific method, because the scientific method gives us no direct and inde
pendent access to consciousness itself. So the scientific method cannot have the final say
on matters concerning consciousness. (pp. 96–97)

Well, that may be so, just as it cannot have the final say on the true nature of the tooth
fairy, but perhaps for the same reason. What is it about consciousness that is supposed to convince us both that it is a real phenomenon of its own and that science
can tell us nothing about it? It doesn’t explain any other phenomenon; while we
must be conscious in some sense to observe things or to ask about consciousness,
we don’t ever observe it, on pain of regress. And we can’t say anything determinate
about it, except to note its mysteries.
Here is Thompson a few pages later:
The upshot is that there is no way to stand outside of consciousness and look at it, in order
to see how it fits into the rest of reality. Science always moves within the field of what
consciousness reveals; it can enlarge this field and open up new vistas, but it can never
get beyond the horizon set by consciousness. In this way, direct experience is primary and
science secondary.
Consciousness is our way of being, and it cannot be objectified, that is, treated as just
another kind of object out there in the world, because it is that by which any object shows
up for us at all. (p. 100)
948

Philosophy East & West

This last remark actually gets things just right. It is not a thing, not an object, not a
phenomenon. If we are using the word “consciousness” not to refer to a thing to be
explained, to a feature of the objective world, but just to our Dasein — our mode of
being — it is no thing at all, and there is nothing to explain, no problem. Dasein, after
all, can never be one more being in the world; it is rather the way in which beings
exist. When I manifest as a teacher in the classroom, there is a way that I teach, but
not three things: me, my teaching and a way. And if we asserted that ways of being
emerged from beings, we would be properly ridiculed.
That is why there is not only no special problem for science here; there is no
special problem about consciousness for us as conscious beings. The mystery of consciousness is simply the mystery of being, the fact that we exist as subjects and have
worlds. And that is no mystery at all. It is just the fact that sufficiently complex biological organisms like us perceive, think, interact, care, and engage in complex ways
with each other and our environment. All of that can be explained, and to think that
there is then some residue is like thinking that we can explain everything, but leave
out the self. There is no self; there is no thing called consciousness. But then why
does Thompson continue as follows?
My view can be described as an emergentist one, in the following sense. I hold that consciousness is a natural phenomenon and that the cognitive complexity of consciousness
increases as a function of the increasing complexity of living beings. Consciousness depends on physical or biological processes, but it also influences the physical or biological
processes on which it depends. I also think the human mind is capable of understanding
how consciousness arises as a natural phenomenon, so I’m not a mysterian.
. . . In my view, however, no concept of nature or physical being that by design excludes
mental or experiential being will work to account for consciousness and its place in
nature.
I take this conclusion to follow from the primacy of consciousness discussed above. Since
consciousness by nature is experiential, and experience is primary and ineliminable, consciousness cannot be reductively explained in terms of what is fundamentally or essentially non-experiential. (p. 103)

Here Thompson oscillates between the steady naturalism to which his experience in
cognitive science leads him, grounding the nature of our subjectivity in our biology
(I, with Candrakīrti, would add our social context and psychology — but no matter)
and then taking consciousness to arise as a new phenomenon. It feels to me like
asking how football arises from twenty-two guys kicking a ball around a field according to FIFA rules. Yes, it is natural, but no it cannot be reductively explained. Nonetheless, it is not a new thing. It just is those guys doing that rule-governed thing. The
mystery is hard to find, and the distinction between the non-experiential and the
experiential is just more smoke and mirrors.
Reflexive Awareness
The smoke gets thicker when we turn consciousness into a kind of inner mirror in
the context of analyzing it as reflexive awareness, a temptation to which Thompson
Jay L. Garfield
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succumbs partly in the thrall of Yogācāra Buddhism and partly due to the influence
of Husserl and his contemporary interpreters. Candrakīrti, as Thompson is well aware,
would have none of this (he is one of the most trenchant critics of the idea of the
reflexivity of awareness), and neither should we. It is good to recall as we consider
this problem that in India as well as Germany, the supposed reflexivity of awareness
was dragged onto the philosophical stage in order to provide an analysis of consciousness. Śāntarakṣita, for instance, tells us that it is the characteristic that distinguishes sentience from insentience. We should be immediately suspicious when we
are offered the essence of something that might not even exist. Here is Thompson on
reflexivity:
When you see the sunset, your seeing isn’t present to you as another object of awareness
like the sunset. Neither is your seeing simply absent to you. Rather, your seeing reveals
itself in the sunset’s appearing to you visually. To use a grammatical metaphor, your
awareness of the sunset is a transitive or object-directed awareness, but your seeing experience is intransitive and reflexive. In this way, your seeing is self-aware.
This kind of self-awareness isn’t a higher-level, introspective, or reflective self-awareness.
It’s not a second-level awareness whose object is the first-level awareness. Rather it’s
contained within or belongs to the first-level awareness. . . .
According to the self-illumination viewpoint, consciousness is self-luminous or self-
revealing. The traditional analogy is that of a light, which shows itself while illuminating
the other things around it. A light illuminating other things doesn’t require another light
to be seen. So, consciousness, in revealing other things, doesn’t need another consciousness to be revealed. (pp. 17–18)

My seeing isn’t present to me as an object. That has to be right, on pain of regress.
And there is a good sense in which it isn’t absent, either: I am seeing. If I weren’t,
I wouldn’t see the sunset. But to say that the seeing reveals itself is a bit much. How
about this instead: The fact that I see a sunset allows me to infer that I am seeing.
Just like the fact that I am now talking allows me to infer that I am alive. But my life
does not reveal itself to me in my speech. Thompson is right to say that the self-
illumination viewpoint regards consciousness as self-luminous like a lamp. But it
also regards it as a thing, and it regards the metaphor of illumination, according to
which this property or substance, or process, shines out on things in the world so that
I can see them.
I think that is a terrible metaphor. Things in the world become apparent to us
by virtue of their effects on us, not by virtue of a light we shine on them. They shine
forth; we don’t. We are aware of them, and only introspectively are we aware of that
fact. Most of the time, the world is present to us with no reflection on our subjectivity. It is hard for philosophers to remember, but only a very small percentage of our
time is spent reflecting on our experience, and when we do that, it is very explicit,
very higher-order.
Only if you thought that that reflective mode is the normal mode of being would
you take it as a paradigm; only if you had to explain that special property of process
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that is consciousness would you dream that it is characterized by reflexivity; only if
you thought that there had to be some property of a self distinct from the biological
and physical properties of living human beings that makes them conscious would
you think that there is this thing called consciousness to be explained. And only if
you did not take Candrakīrti to heart would you think that.
It is easy to miss what Candrakīrti (or Hume) is trying to say. Thompson is trying
to weave Vedānta and Buddhism together as the philosophical background against
which to understand the fusion of phenomenology and cognitive science. But they
represent very different perspectives. One posits a self whose essence is to be conscious, and whose consciousness in the end is entirely self-consciousness. That is the
sat-cit-ananda of Śaṅkara’s Vedānta. It is a profound tradition. The other rejects the
self, rejects consciousness as anything more than a relation of perceiver to perceived
and in its most mature moment rejects the reflexivity of consciousness. They are uneasy bedfellows, and I advise Thompson to give up on the threesome.

Note
1    –    Compare the Müller-Lyer illusion. The “equality” of the two lines is not con
structed; it is illusory. We can talk about the process of constructing the illusion,
but not of the construction of the equality we take ourselves to see.
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